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The different target of the time period has been established over the past two decades in the 
institutionalization of a single currency union in West Africa. Depending on varied reasons the 
proposed programs have always failed before the set timelines in respect of ECOWAS monetary 
unification and single currency adoption. As a result, the paper explored and developed its 
argument based on the existing studies of structured economic shocks, significant to the failure 
of the single currency union, and its major causal factors. And with observed structured analysis 
propose catalytic activator method as a theoretical guide to attain the single currency union 
within three (3) years ahead, if the necessary requirement as the commitment level of members’ 
State is applied towards the single currency unification program. It then elaborates in the spirit of 
precision the process required to sustain the eco-currency program in other to elevate members 
State in an out-date of its domestic currencies struggling as a subservient economic bloc to the 
adoption of a new anticipated domineering currency in its own merit to shoulder with the global 
dominating hard currencies. 
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A. HISTORY AND BACKGROUND OF ECO-CURRENCY 
INSTITUTIONALIZATION 
               Ever since the idea of establishing a single currency for the Economic Community of 
West African States (ECOWAS) was first launched in Conakry Guinea in 1983 after ECOWAS 
was founded in 1975 and operationalized from 1979 to bring together brothers of the Portuguese-
speaking countries, French-speaking countries, and English Speaking countries together. There 
have been varied submitted intellectual works to argue for and against the success of a single 
currency union proposal, which hasn’t find the daylight yet. With estimated evidence of 58% of 
quality papers on this subject matter from independent scholars based in Europe and USA, 30% 
of the independent scholars from the francophone countries within the ECOWAS region, 10% 
among the Anglophone countries within the ECOWAS region led by Nigerian authors and the 
remaining 2% from the Asian Universities led by China. When the single currency union was 
lunched, a monetary cooperation program was proposed, which was subsequently validated in 
July 1987 according to the account of (Amato & Nubukpo, 2020). In other to implement the idea 
of a single currency at the level of the entire ECOWAS, the new West Africa Monetary Agency 
(WAMA) was formed in 1996 to replace the Monetary Cooperation Program (MCP) tasked to 
accomplish the following;  
[I] In the short term phase the agency was charged to strengthen the currency payment 
mechanism of the West Africa clearing house by removing outstanding payment arrears.  
[II] Introduction of new payment instrument such as travelers’ cheque 
[III] The introduction of credit guarantees funds to support the clearing mechanism and remove 
all non-tariff barriers that limit the use of national currencies for payments of certain 
transactions, such as hotel bills, airline tickets, etc. 
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[IV] In the medium term, the agency was to oversee the limited conversion of national 
currencies, which must be eliminated to avoid restrictions in inter-currency exchange 
[V] In the long term, it was the agency's focus to create a single ECOWAS currency monetary 
area that modifies the use of a single convertible currency. 
               The Political commitment to renewed monetary cooperation was carried out by Ghana 
and Nigeria after December 1999 and subsequently accepted by Guinea, the Gambia, Sierra 
Leone, and Liberia constituting a new league of Anglophone countries to transform the idea of 
an acceleration approach towards monetary integration into actualize actions in a realistic and 
achievable proposal and collaborate with the francophone counterpart to create a successful 
monetary union with a single currency agenda. The crystallization of this idea led to the 
formation of the West Africa Monetary Zone (WFMZ) on April 20, 2000, in Accra, Ghana. In 
the 2nd Summit of the African Conference of Heads of State and Government on the 15th 
December 2000; the statute of the future Central Bank of the West Africa Monetary Zone was 
drafted. The next effort was to be pooling of foreign reserves, as well as negotiate the 
convertibility of the foreign currency guarantee with an appropriate international agency. Which 
required members’ State to implement economic reform programs to achieve macroeconomic 
convergence including political reform agenda. 
              On the 21st December 2019, this union defined its latest step of execution, which was to 
conclude the credibility of the monetary integration of the ECOWAS made up of 15 countries as 
a whole, instead of 16 countries. These countries are Sierra Leone, Ivory Coast, Nigeria, Benin, 
Ghana, Guinea-Conakry, Gambia, Burkina Faso, Niger, Liberia, Togo, Cape Verde, Senegal, 
Guinea-Bissau, Mali, and Togo. Which the 16th Country Mauritania with a minor misunderstand 
redrew from the membership of ECOWAS on 26th December 2000. With the paper holding a 
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strong conviction of her return soon as a founding member of this Union. With the community 
unanimous understanding that to attain credibility of the monetary integration of the ECOWAS 
area strictly depends not only on monetary stability but also on the implementation of a 
mechanism to support a strong, inclusive, and development centered growth. Which had 
monetary integration as the integral component of the ECOWAS vision 2020. The aim of this 
vision is the intensification of the integration process through the promotion of the West African 
identity and community, within the populations of the continent of Africa and the world as a 
whole. Therefore, the regional strategic plan of the ECOWAS was to see the intensification of 
economic and monetary integration as an important pillar for the development of the community. 
Meanwhile (Saxegaard, 2006: Buchs & Mathisen, 2005: Senzu, 2019), they were very 
pessimistic and argued that the success of single currency union of ECOWAS for vision 2020 
was likely impossible because the community is having many monetary problems, in particular, 
the immediate non-convertibility between their currencies and poorly developed financial 
systems and payment channels as well as ineffective monetary policies transmission channels. 
To crown, it all was an observation of strong imbalances between the exchange rates of different 
currencies in play within the region including high national debt to GDP effect. Nevertheless, the 
single currency union was not a mission impossible beyond ECOWAS vision 2020. 
 
B. LITERATURE AND THEORY OF OPTIMAL CURRENCY AREA 
                In the early works of the single currency union and monetary zone, Mundell (1961) 
argued, factors to define an optimal currency area was labour mobility and price flexibility. 
Subsequent studies in this area from (Mckinnon, 1963: Kenen, 1969) concluded, such criteria 
from Mundell, may not necessarily be the conditions towards the establishment of a monetary 
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union but the objectives to be achieved through the establishment of the optimal currency area, 
with new findings, which presented Static and Dynamic analysis of optimality of a currency area. 
The Static approach focuses on the analysis of exogenously given criteria of an optimal currency 
area, why the dynamic approach focuses on endogenous. (Mundell, 1961: McKinnon, 1963: 
Kenen, 1969) all hold to the simplest definition of an optimal currency area (OCA), as a 
geographic region in which the establishment of a single currency would be beneficial because 
the benefit for the area as a whole would be greater than the costs, for the simple reason that the 
operating conditions of the area are already given. Mundell (1961) studies, postulated specific 
trade-offs to measure costs and benefits. He stated, to form an optimal currency area, the area 
should not be too small to avoid the risk of speculation on the International monetary markets, 
but not also too large, because differences between countries increase with geographical 
extension, which inhibits the key criterion for a good optimal currency area, which demand a 
high degree of mobility of factors to production with special emphasis to labour. And believe is a 
means to nullify the effect of exogenous asymmetric shocks. And concluded in the absence of 
sufficient mobility, recommended the exchange rate flexibility regime as an adjustment channel. 
(Setsofia et. al, 2020) asserts, the current study focused in ECOWAS region complemented the 
earlier theories of the need of people within the optimal currency area to [i] Easily move across 
countries for trade, business and employment [ii] The OCA should be broad in production and 
experts structure [iii] Countries in the designated OCA should be self-sufficient and less 
dependent in terms of financial and economic planning as well as expenses [iv] The will of 
individual countries within the zone program to mutually compensate to each other during trade 
deficit difficulties among member countries. However, McKinnon (1963), had argued earlier, 
when a country is more open to trade, the more it wages and prices are influenced by the 
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exchange rate. Therefore to be able to solve for less changes in the exchange rate, did required 
external adjustment channel operation, through the improvement of ‘terms of trade’. (Nubukpo, 
2019: Giro, 2019) submitted from their studies, ECOWAS countries are very open economies, 
positioned in the lower part of the global value chain, with weak complementary index and a 
very low level of interchange. For this very reason (Amato & Nunokpo, 2020) submitted an 
empirical report of Trade Specialization Index of ECOWAS from 1995-2012, which was 
fluctuating between 0.75 and 0.95 for Coffee, Tea, Cocoa, Spices and derived commodities of an 
average of 0.87. In the ECOWAS region, it trade specialization index of Cocoa was 0.98 against 
0.52 for Coffee. Fruit and Vegetable were 0.35, Cotton was (-0.70), Glass (-0.95), Iron and Steel 
(-0.88), and (-0.58) manufacturing products. And concluded the ECOWAS condition is 
characterized by a preponderance of significant coefficients for structural demand shocks 
compared to structural supply shocks. Kenen (1969) submitted, the desire of a given economy to 
join a monetary union should depend on the level of diversification, meaning internal 
specialization of prospective economies of the union. Which, he further argued, a more 
diversified economy is less exposed to the risk of being destabilized by the kind of shock, hence 
the exchange rate becomes less useful for obtaining macroeconomic adjustment and rather 
emphasize on the importance of fiscal integration as an adjustment tool. Since the ECOWAS 
region has a very weak trade specialization, then exchange rate regime will be a required 
criterion for the ECOWAS monetary union moving forward, as a result, Swinwaka (2010) 
proposed fixed exchange rate as the option for the ECOWAS proposed optimal currency area, 
then (Diop and Fall, 2011) complemented the earlier preposition with an empirical 
demonstration of ECOWAS optimal currency area to depend on fixed or intermediate exchange 
rate. With the new comprehensive approach to exchange rate proposed by (Amato & Nunokpo, 
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2020), which suggested, the approach to the exchange rate regime to the entering of the single 
currency program should depend on the following conditional factors prevailing as outlined 
below; 
[i] A regime of fixed exchange rates with fiscal federalism 
[ii] A flexible exchange rate regime with coordination of tax policies 
[iii] A flexible exchange rate regime with fiscal federalism only in (Ideal scenario) 
This conclusion was established from a theoretical proposition of ex-post argument of Sala-i-
Martin and Sachs (1992), who indicated that 30-50% of income decreases caused by asymmetric 
shocks is subsequently compensated by Federal Budget in a form of transfers and tax reductions 
as an insurance mechanism in the proper functioning of the monetary union in the USA. In the 
following year Krugman (1993), did show that the establishment of a fixed exchange rate regime 
between economies of a currency area, and even more so the adoption of a single currency would 
lead to a specialization of individual countries and therefore to asymmetric shocks. And believe 
that integration allows for intensification of comparative advantages, which in turn results in a 
strong specialization in the production of goods. The high exchange rate has always lead to 
inflation in the domestic economy. Which the works of Fleming, 1971 submitted in favour of the 
traditional framework of optimal currency area focusing on the convergence of inflation rate 
argued, such problem is easier to solve when there is a synchronization of business cycles and 
the volume of trade of each member country.  Beginning from 1994, theoreticians began to 
critique the validity of the whole theory of Optimal Currency Area (OCA), starting with (Tavlas, 
1994), he said, OCA conditions do not offer a unifying analytical framework. And concluded the 
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boundaries of the optimality of an area change according to how different the working theories 
of the area are combined. (De Grauwe, 1996) posited his modern version of OCA theory, 
indicating that the convergence of inflation rates, interest rates, and fiscal policies is neither 
necessary nor sufficient for the construction of a well-established monetary union. And with his 
established findings concluded, the Institutional structure of the labour market should be a key 
factor in the analysis of OCAs with the reason that countries with different labour market risk, 
pay very high prices if they decide to proceed with a monetary unification.  (Frankel and Rose, 
1997; 1998), further, submit the intensification of economic integration favours the generation of 
symmetrical economic cycles. And cleverly concluded in their book (Frankel & Rose, 1997, 
p.101) commercial integration and synchronization of business cycles as a precondition for the 
success of a monetary union known as an ex-ante effort is impractical and can nevertheless 
become beneficial ex-post. And empirically demonstrated, if the greater commercialization 
integration implies a synchronization of business cycles and monetary union, which is to trigger 
greater trade integration between member countries, then it will imply a higher degree of 
business cycle synchronization. Then the formation of the monetary union could, therefore, 
generate on itself the conditions of its own optimality. But then Emerson et. al (1992), 
distinguished between common shocks, which affect all countries in the OCA in question and 
specific shocks which affect specific countries in the area. Hence termed the symmetric shocks 
as common shocks that have an identical impact for all countries within the OCA with different 
intensity and amplitude. Shocks that affect only a country in an OCA is termed as idiosyncratic 
shocks. Therefore the analysis of the asymmetry of shocks is very important for the endurance of 
a currency area, which (Be´nassy- Que´re´et.al, 2009) concluded in his shocks theory, that the 
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cost of monetary union proves to be increasing function of the degree of asymmetry of shocks 
between countries involved in the process. 
 
C. THE THEORY OF APPROPRIATE EXCHANGE RATE REGIME FOR ECOWAS 
OPTIMAL CURRENCY AREA 
               In the emergence of International trading of currencies, it gave birth to international 
finance, which exchange rate programs became a specialized field of study with the reason to 
resolve problems associated with the currencies exchange among countries on a global scale. 
This resulted in the birth of different forms of exchange rate regimes in the school of 
international finance as follows; 
[i] Free-floating exchange regime 
[ii] Managed floating regime 
[iii] Fixed exchange regime (fixed nominal central parity) 
[iv] Fundamental equilibrium exchange regime 
[v] Crawling peg regime 
[vi] Basket peg regime 
[vii] Adjustable peg regime 
Out of varied exchange rate regimes, OCAs theoreticians for the ECOWAS region has proposed 
different exchange rate application based on their stylish empirical reasons as the best option for 
the monetary union. However, considering the current submitted exchange rate approach to be 
adopted, which was proposed by (Amato & Nubukpo, 2020) for ECOWAS OCA, they gave a 
historic reference of IMF assessment of the Anglophone countries championing the single 
currency union from 2018, that IMF classified Guinea and Nigeria as a country with a stabilized 
arrangement with a monetary aggregate target (Managed floating regime) as a channel tool used 
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by it Central Bank, followed by Liberia with a managed (Fixed exchange regime) arrangement 
with the US-dollar as exchange rate anchor, then Sierra Leone and Gambia managed floating 
exchange rate (fundamental equilibrium) arrangement with a monetary aggregate target and 
finally, Ghana with floating exchange rate (fundamental equilibrium) arrangement with an 
inflation-targeting framework. Further argued that the 1960s orientation adopted by the Bretton 
Woods agreements consisted of maintaining fixed exchange rates to regulate capital movements, 
which arose an interest in economic areas characterized by the adoption of a single currency. 
However, Grier and Smallwood (2007) demonstrated that in the case of developing countries, the 
negative effects of exchange rate volatility on trade are much stronger. Which became 
evidenced, a system of flexible exchange rates would be conducive to the removal of controls on 
the movement of goods and capital among countries while promoting multilateral trade. This 
presented a question, what is the relationship between trade and exchange rate regime adoption 
of a country or a single currency union area at the global market. And this was succinctly argued 
in the work of Heller & Knight (1978), they said, what distinguishes the new international 
monetary system from the Bretton wood regime is the increased degree of exchange rate 
flexibility. And conclude, exchange rates are determined by the demands and supplies to arise 
from the interaction of the various market participants. This makes decisions on the size and 
composition of foreign-exchange balances more complicated for both private transactions and 
Central Banks. And concluded, two factors drive Central Bank’s selection of its foreign 
exchange portfolio, which are; [i] The country choice of exchange rate regime and [ii] Pattern of 
its international trade. And finally justified empirically, Central Bank's demand for foreign 
exchange mostly depends on the interest rate holdings, which also depends primarily on the 
country’s exchange rate arrangement and by its trade with reserve-currency countries. Further, 
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clarify the systematic difference between the Eurodollar portfolio behaviour of developed and 
less developed countries. 
 
D. EX POST CASE ANALYSIS OF EUROPEAN MONETARY UNION 
                As it was submitted by (Kelly, 2003), the single currency proposition leading to the 
European Union, started with the Schuman Plan of 1950. So the setting-up of the European 
monetary system in two decades later was intended to be a move towards a monetary union, but 
it was not until the mid-1980s that the “Single Market” program gave the project a renewed life. 
Support gathered led to the signing of the European Act in 1986 with the single currency being 
seen as a logical complement to a market without frontiers. The action followed at the Hanover 
Summit in June 1988, when a committee under the chairmanship of Commission, Jacques Delors 
was established to propose concrete steps towards the realization of European monetary union. 
The Delors Report was endorsed by the Madrid Summit in June 1989. Which envisaged three 
stages on the path to the European Union. This was later given a legal basis in the Treaty on 
European Union (Maastricht Treaty) and formally signed in February 1992. The Treaty also 
specified the European Monetary Union convergence criteria and set dates for the achievement 
of the various steps along the way. With a well-defined benefit of forming and joining the union, 
which were listed as; 
[i] Benefiting from a low-interest rate regime 
[ii] An enabling environment for competitiveness effect as well as high inflow of investment 
[iii] Benefiting from a minimized cost of foreign exchange transactions 
 
 
P a g e  12 | 43 
 
 
E.  ECOWAS SINGLE CURRENCY AND CONVERGENCE THEORY 
                 The previous theoretical proposition as the absolute pre-condition economic criteria 
for convergence of ECOWAS members’ State and single currency adoption were established as 
follows; 
[1] Primary deficit to nominal GDP ratio should be greater than and equal to -3% of a Member 
State. 
[2] The mean annual inflation rate of Members State should be less than and equal to 3% 
[3] The public depth to nominal GDP ratio of Members State should be less than and equal to 
70% 
[4] The public sector wage bill to tax revenue of Members State should be less than and equal to 
35% 
[5] The tax revenue to nominal GDP ratio of Members State should be greater than and equal to 
20% 
(Senzu, 2019) submitted necessary conditions as a complementary to the stipulated rules for 
convergence by urging the West Africa Monetary Institute to carry on with the responsibility to 
undertake the following assignment; 
[a] Design the policy framework to guide the individual members' State for quality management 
of fiscal deficits to ensure price stability for pre and post-convergence. 
[b] Design a comprehensive zonal budget program towards the monetary convergence to address 
the burden of potential asymmetric shocks across members’ State. 
[c] Design a budget program to manage the rise of macroeconomic shocks of members’ State 
during the complete switch from the domestic to the zonal currency. 
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However, under this heading, I therefore posit, the current theoretical argument of convergence 
criteria as outlined above and prescribed by the West Africa Monetary Institute should be 
structured into two main criteria, with this study making an addition to the criteria’s on the basis 
of empirical justification. The two main classification of the criteria will be ‘primary’ and 
‘secondary’. The primary criteria going to be defined as the convergence criteria, which are 
prerequisites for convergence of the members' State economy. While the secondary criteria is a 
proposed convergence criteria, which are necessary to be realized at the post-convergence period 
of the members’ State economy, in other words, the Statutory Central Bank of the Union to be 
established will drive on such theory as a policy guide in it monetary instrument implementation 
plan. Below is the deduced structured classification as a policy guide, which encompasses both 
the old accurately studied and developed policy plan including the currently established policy 
factor in section [1c] not captured in earlier studies to be included as a policy instrument for 
primary economic convergence: 
 
 [1] Primary Economic Convergence criteria: 
       (a) Public depth to nominal GDP ratio of ≤ 70% 
       (b) Tax revenue to nominal GDP ratio ≥ 20% 
       (c) Public external debt to GNI ratio of ≤ 30% 
 
[2] Secondary Economic Convergence criteria: 
     (d) Mean annual inflation rate ≤ 3% 
     (e) Public sector wage bill to tax revenue ≤ 35% 
     (f)  Primary deficit to nominal GDP ratio ≥ -3% 
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                 It is was simply defined in previous studies that the Government debt to GDP annually 
should not exceed 70%. However, this research study paid particular attention to the currency 
type, which is mostly soft-currencies in character managed by Members State and concludes 
with the kind of currencies managed in the ECOWAS bloc to uphold such a policy Instrument of 
(1a) above as a pre-convergence criterion, makes such policy instruction ambiguous for sound 
monetarist analysis. The paper, therefore, agree that the empirical basis to establish the 
government debt portfolio policy range to peg at 70% as the target for members State single 
currency union is reasonable but demand that the government debts portfolio should be 
structured into a basket of external and internal debts model for members State. Which the paper 
further submit that members State are not to exceed 30% external debt of GNI and 40% internal 
debt of GDP as the accurate recommended approach for the Single currency program of the 
ECOWAS monetary union. It is within this context that the asymmetric shocks across member 
States economy could be managed effectively to sustain the programmed value of the Eco-
currency and its intent to the benefit of Members State. 
               At the current juncture, it has become the burden of empiricism in a form of theoretical 
justification to evaluate the status of the West Africa single currency union after ECOWAS 
vision 2020, whether the primary economic convergence criteria as defined above are possible in 
the shortest possible time among members' State, with consideration to the current state of 
Members economic performance. It further raises the question, if the submission of empirical 
deduction disagrees with positive convergence, is there an alternative theoretical proposal to 
stimulate and activate convergence as a catalyst? The answer to this question establishes the 
conceptual framework of this paper. Below is a table Labeled ‘E1’, which captures the 
convergence criteria factor analysis among the Sixteen (16) member states of ECOWAS in the 
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West Africa Region to examine the degree of current divergence of the members' State economic 
performance subjected to data analysis for the empirical deduction.
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Table ‘E1’ 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                           Senzu (2020) 
 
 
YR/2019 CONVERGENCE CONDITIONAL  ANALYSIS 
COUNTRIES         Public Debt% of GDP Nominal GDP | 
Billion (US$) 
Tax Revenue% 
of GDP (2018) 
External Debt | 
Billion (US$) 
External Debt % of 
GDP 
Benine 54.60%  14.37               -                                 2.80  19.49%  
Burkina Faso 38.10%  14.59  17.20  3.06  20.97%  
Cape Verde 125.80%  2.01               -          1.71  85.07%  
Cote d'ivore 47.00%  44.44  15.90  13.07  29.41%  
Gambia 88.00%  1.77                -         0.59  33.33%  
Ghana 71.80%  67.08  12.60  22.14  33.01%  
Guinea 37.90%  13.37               -              1.46  10.91%  
Guinea-Bissau 53.90%  1.40               -                  1.10  78.57%  
Liberia 34.40%  3.22               -              1.04  32.30%  
Mali 35.40%  17.65  11.60  4.19  23.74%  
Mauritania 96.60%  14.39               -               4.15  28.84%  
Nigeria 21.80%  446.54               -                 40.96  9.17%  
Niger  45.30%  9.44               -              3.73  39.51%  
Senegal 48.30%  23.94  15.70  8.57  35.80%  
Sierra Leone 63.90%  4.23              -            1.62  38.30%  
Togo 75.70%  5.50  16.88  1.44  26.18%  
           
The Symbol (-) used in the data represent absence of country certified data report to IMF & World Bank    
Above data is a World Bank extracted data subjected into computational analysis and tabled.     
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                The table ‘E1’ above suggests to us, none of the members' States have been 
successful to meet all the primary economic convergence criteria as of the 2018/2019 data 
report.  At most 75% of the members’ State met one of the mandatory primary convergence 
criteria consistently for the past 10 years and mostly found among member countries with 
intent or an honest drive for a single currency union. Furthermore, a critical study of the table 
‘E1’ does conclude, the divergence of members State economy based on established primary 
macroeconomic convergence criteria is quite wide to build a hope of a possible future 
convergence naturally out of the State actors of member nations. And it was observed, the 
wide divergence of members State economy highly emanate from the following factors; 
[i] Very weak inter-trading index among members’ State 
[ii] Poor management of fiscal deficit due to the degree of political expedience of 
members’ State in favour of domestic politics 
[iii] Poor policy instrument in establishing interconnection involving public sector 
wage bill, economic production, and tax revenue collection framework. 
[iv] There is a lack of effective individual member nation approach to manage and 
safeguard the foreign exchange reserve account managed by their Central Banks. 
Understanding and appreciating these challenges outlined among members’ State of 
ECOWAS in varying degrees of macroeconomic shocks as a sovereign nation, dictates no 
hope of convergence in the near future if we are to count on the independent capacity of 
members’ State actions. Then the question is, what should be an alternative approach to 
catalyze the effort of economic convergence among member nation, who still have the 
absolute desire and the will for single currency union within the shortest possible time? The 
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paper, therefore, proposes an alternative theoretical pathway for the single currency union 
program of the ECOWAS region and term it as Catalyst Theory of Economic Convergence. 
 
F. CATALYST THEORETICAL PROPOSITION FOR ECOWAS SINGLE 
CURRENCY PROGRAM 
                  The paper does still holds the view that the primary macroeconomic convergence 
criteria are must meet prerequisite conditions towards the single currency union and it is 
inescapable as a road map to a quality monetary union with its associated benefit. However, 
the current approach to achieving such an objective of a single currency union is impossible to 
realize considering the communication of the historic data of members’ State economic 
performance as an empirical basis to forecast the future. Hence, the paper propose, the needed 
action now to the future requires the old agencies, which were charged to expedite 
convergence action of members’ State to initiate the fulfillment of ECOWAS 2020 vision of a 
single currency union, which has failed, to be dissolved immediately leading to an 
Institutionalization of a pre-convergence ECOWAS virtual Central Bank to be charged with a 
3-year maximum pre-convergence catalyzation mandate to unionize the macroeconomic 
operating system of the members' State economy.   With the structure of such pre-
convergence ECOWAS virtual Central Bank label below as figure F1. With a clearly defined 
task of its departmental / committee level offices operations for the three (3) years period. 
After the three (3) year mandate, this virtual ECOWAS Central Bank should deliver the 
ECOWAS region into a single currency union, which will result to the transitioning of such a 
pre-convergence ECOWAS virtual Central Bank into a full backed legal instrument of a 
chartered ECOWAS Central Bank through the ECOWAS parliament with a newly proposed 
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structure of organizational operations labeled in this paper as Fig. F2. With the legal power to 
issue Eco-currency and managed it among and on behalf of members State. 
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Fig. ‘F1’ 
Proposed Pre-Convergence ECOWAS virtual Central Bank Structure 
 
Senzu, 2020
Central Bank Governors 
of Members State
(Scholars)
Economists & Legal Experts
Council of the Central Bank
Technical committee tasked with the 
pre-convergence catalyzation
Monetary policy instrument 
development committee for pre-
convergence catalyzation
Office in-charge of Economic 
production, wage bill & taxation 
convergence policy framework
Office in-charge of Inter members 
State Trade and External Trade 
policy framework
Office in-charge of Currency 
management policy framework
Committee for International Financial 
Affairs to deal with IMF, World Bank, 
ECB and the Rating agencies
Adhoc negotiation committee in 
charge of policy adoption among 
members State
Finance Ministers of 
Members State
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                For the detail and reasonable understanding of the organogram labeled as Fig. ‘F1’, 
the office under the technical committee of the pre-convergence virtual Central Bank must be 
assigned to the following special task below towards the accomplishment of the objective. In 
the proposed Catalyst theory the office of the ‘Technical Committee’ should have the 
following sub-structured department termed as; 
 [1] Monetary Policy Development Committee 
[2] Committee for International Financial Affairs 
[3] Ad hoc Negotiating Committee 
The [1] and [2] committees will have within it certain structured and specialized office 
roles as outlined below; 
 [1] Monetary Policy Development Committee 
This specialized office as the ‘Monetary policy development committee’ will be the first arm 
of the ‘Technical Committee’ according to the organogram from Fig. ‘F1’ with other sub-
operating offices, to be established with special task focus as defined below; 
      i. The policy development office of labour, wage bill, and taxation convergence: 
This office should be tasked to study the production level of members' economy, labour 
performance rate, wage bill, and taxation program variation of members’ State, to 
establish the microeconomic factors that have the potential to cause asymmetric shocks 
across members’ State towards convergence. And develop a proactive policy 
framework as a convergence instrument for the Union on behalf of the technical 
committee. 
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         ii. The policy development office of Inter-members State trade 
This office should be tasked to study beyond the members' State current international 
trade performance and focus on identifying production performance in relation to the 
competitive strengths and diversification of individual members’ State at the 
international market as a trade specialization for the Union. Secondly, examine current 
members’ State's data of trade importations to assess whether certain imported choices 
of products could be supplied effectively by members’ State to encourage the boost of 
the relative value of the proposed Eco-currency at the global financial market. And 
finally, identify how the members' State primary sector economy could be 
progressively transformed in the shortest possible time to a mature secondary sector 
economy. And develop a comprehensive policy framework for the convergence 
economy on behalf of the proposed Central Bank and its associated technical 
committee. 
       iii. The Policy development office of Currency management: 
This office has to be one of the permanent arms of the ECOWAS Central Bank when it 
formally receives the charter to operate. But prior to the economic convergence agenda 
under the Catalyst theory, their core responsibility should be a critical study into the 
foreign exchange market performance and external foreign exchange reserve 
management mechanism of members State Central Banks, taken a critical consideration 
of the politico-economic ecosystem of West Africa region as a basis to establish an 
appropriate exchange rate regime policy program for the Eco-currency environment. 
Secondly, identify effective monetary policy communication channels very friendly to 
P a g e  23 | 43 
 
the monetary union as a means to minimize any macroeconomic shocks to the barest 
level at any point in time. And develop a policy framework towards the convergence 
including the procedure to manage the potential macroeconomic shocks likely to spring 
out when members’ State are at the stage of switching from domestic currency to Eco-
currency in the convergence period. 
[2] Committee for International Financial Affairs: 
                This formidable office to be instituted under the pre-convergence ECOWAS virtual 
Central Bank as a requirement under the Catalyst theory is to become the second arm of the 
‘Technical Committee’ from the organogram ‘F1’, it should hold a major task of acting as an 
international public relation and legal negotiator of the ‘Technical committee’ on the various 
stages of the single currency union of the ECOWAS region to the global financial community, 
engaging its leading agencies outlined as the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, 
European Central Bank, The Federal Reserve committee of the United States of America 
towards the economic convergence of the members' State. Not excluding the United Nations 
approved economic and credit rating agencies for data synchronization with the Bank. 
 [3] Ad hoc Negotiation Committee: 
                  The formation of this office is to be used as a medium of technically 
communicating research findings of the 'Technical Committee' based on approved developed 
policies from the ‘Monetary policy development committee’ to members State and skilfully 
mediating between the Instituted ‘Technical Committee’ and members State appropriate 
public agencies in closed doors towards the exact considered date for the formal 
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institutionalization of the ECOWAS Central Bank and Eco-currency issuance for members 
State to adopt. 
G. PROPOSED POST-CONVERGENCE ECOWAS CENTRAL BANK 
STRUCTURE 
                 The paper believes that the pre-convergence operational performance of the 
Catalyst theory to usher the union into a single currency regime has to immediately have in it 
a model implementation archives towards a post established architecture framework of the 
ECOWAS Central Bank, which will receive a charter instrument from the ECOWAS 
Parliament to uphold the sovereign detect of the monetary administration of the members 
State with the mandatory authority to issue Eco-currency. The structured model organogram 
provided herein as label Fig.’ G1’ is expected to be subjected to modification depending on 
what the reality of the politico-economic climate may present to the Union in the post era. The 
paper upholds the view that the proposed organogram labeled as Fig. ‘G1’ below as the post-
convergence ECOWAS Central Bank structural model holds the appropriate system that takes 
into consideration the politico-economic function of the West Africa region to dictate and 
manage a sustainable monetary economic stance of members State for a single currency 
union. 
                  However, the Catalyst theory refuses to assign a strict proposed task to the listed 
offices in the organogram for the post-convergence Central Bank structural model unlike how 
it carefully ascribed operational roles to the offices at the pre-convergence virtual ECOWAS 
Central Bank with the reason that, the proposed model herein should be a foundational 
structure for the appointed catalysts ‘Technical committee’ who are to assure convergence in 
the shortest possible time. And further, uphold the belief that the research findings in the 
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period of three (3) years by the virtual Central Bank will identify new relevant economic 
factors to contribute to effective policy design framework for the post-convergence monetary 
union operations of the Central Bank for the ECOWAS region as a guide to inform the 
permanent pragmatic modeling structures of the offices and qualified task as an input to the 
below proposed Fig.’ G1’s organogram to effectively and efficiently champion the ECOWAS 
single currency union. 
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Fig. ‘G1’ Proposed Post-Convergence ECOWAS Central Bank Structure 
Senzu, 2020    
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               It became a previous theoretical admission and a persuasion that the centralized 
market to promote the single currency union should be advanced by a member country with 
a high weighted average economy, but the conclusion of this paper argue contrarily and 
posits the positioning of the centralized market in the advancement of this monetary union 
course should depend on a member State’s with the independent capacity to meet all the 
primary convergence criteria, with certain infrastructures and in addition a critical skill in its 
debt portfolio management . That will confirm the discipline economic system run by such a 
member State to captain the single currency union agenda but must also have access to a 
quality shipping harbour and an Airport with an advanced institutionalize technology of 
running those sector facilities. As a result, the paper proposes the names of member nations 
of ECOWAS bloc from the 2019/2020 field study and observation, holding the optimum 
potential to compete in the request to serve as the locational base or the Centre market for 
the operation of the ECOWAS monetary zone based on the additional assessment criteria as 
follows; the economic structural system, the performance of national economy of Member 
State and the quality of the infrastructural facilities and amenities as earlier put forward in 
this paper. Hence, the qualified names as in 2020 are noted to be Nigeria, Senegal, 
Mauritania, Cote d'Ivoire, and Ghana. Based on such conclusion, these five listed countries 
were subjected to data analysis of their national debt portfolio from 2009 to 2018 with the 
study relying on a raw data extract from the United Nation Statistical office and the World 
Bank research team through a contracted agency of theglobaleconomy.com and subjecting it 
to careful analysis. 
Among the primary indicators as the criteria for the pre-convergence status, government 
debts of member nations are established to be having a great significant influence on the 
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weight of asymmetric shocks across members’ economy. With proof that out of a certain 
debt threshold will expose the vulnerability of the ECOWAS Central Bank in its capacity to 
manage the value of the proposed Eco-currency to effectively attain the benefit intended for 
the single currency union. 
Fig. I 1. 
 
                                                                                                (Data Analysis from 2009-2018: Senzu, 2020.) 
 
 
A very good analytical observation of the chart depicts Government Debts portfolio analysis 
as a percentage of GDP from 2009 to 2018 among the five listed member States, which is 
established to meet the assessment standards in housing the monetary zone or observed to be 
a suitable site to station the ECOWAS Central Bank. As a result, the study conducted a 
comparative analysis to establish the most suitable market among the Members State per 
their favourability in administrating the West Africa monetary union program. And the 
graphical deduction submits that Nigeria holds the lowest debt density comparable to other 
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least option to situate the proposed ECOWAS Central Bank to manage the Eco-currency. The 
second attempt was to examine and analyzed the external debts of these selected Members 
State that has the qualified potential to become the localize base for administering the 
ECOWAS monetary zone single currency program. Which the findings are graphically 
presented as Fig.I2 below; 
 












                                                                              
                                                                                     (Data analysis from 2009-2018: Senzu, 2020) 
 
The graphical representation of Fig.I2 examines the comparative external debt analysis of 
Members national economy as a policy requirement and the findings per the chart deduce 
that Nigeria is the best market option followed by Senegal, then Ghana as the most suitable 
site to establish the ECOWAS Central Bank as at the year 2020. With these three mention 
countries none of their bar graphs crosses a 30% limit as the approved pre-convergence 
criteria. And among these three countries, Nigeria is found to be having the lowest density of 
external debt portfolio in the percentage of Gross National Income comparable to the others. 






External Debt % GNI
Qualified market to drive ECOWAS monetary zone
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H. CONCLUSION 
The paper conclude the 'Technical Committee' of the virtual ECOWAS Central Bank needs 
to be inaugurated by the ECOWAS parliament to work from this centralized market as an 
administrative office under the certificate of urgency. With the agenda to resolve the factors 
below that contribute to asymmetric economic shocks across member countries. With the 
following as the study resolution focus; 
  [1] Policy instruction and models to facilitate the promotion of intra-trade 
among members’ State based on comparative advantages. 
 [2] Structuring members’ State into trade specialization and diversification as 
the new monetary union portfolio with careful consideration on the competitive 
strength of member countries as a policy direction. 
 [3] Re-designing and promoting labour market efficiency with corresponding 
wage bill management in reference to its GDP performance as member countries 
of the Union. 
 [4] Initiate an effective revenue mobilization method for both the formal and 
informal sectors, which will be universally applied method across members’ 
State. 
[5] Instituting exchange rate regime easily admissible and effective as a tool to 
manage a single currency union among the sixteen (16) member countries. 
Despite there are proposed exchange rate mechanisms by certain authoritative 
papers on this subject matter. However, it has to be admitted to every tool of 
exchange rate employed by a Central Bank has its advantage and disadvantages. 
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And the best-proposed option should always be the method with a greater 
advantage in its application comparable to the expected disadvantages.   
For Instance, the current exchange rate mechanism by the West Africa francophone 
monetary union in the use of CFA franc pegging to the Euro as the base currency is 
operating with a crawling peg exchange rate regime using France treasury as a 
guarantee. This will be a poorly adopted regime in managing Eco-currency considering 
the expected floating behaviour for the currency towards the economic benefit of 
individual member States and sterilization strategies in managing economic shocks. It 
must be noted that the catalytic institutionalization of the ‘Eco-currency’ is motivated 
to stretch the width of members’ State to re-engineer their economic efficiency rate to 
join the global trade hub and facilitate easy access to investment with the lowest 
interest rate capital accessibility in favour of members State industrial production and 
scale-up of employment opportunities comparable to the current performance of 
individual members State in their national welfare obligations. 
  [6] To establish proven and effective communication channels for the ECOWAS 
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i. GNI........................Gross National Index 
ii. GDP.......................Gross Domestic Products 
iii. ECOWAS.............. Economic community of West Africa States 




Country Code Year 
Government debt 
as percent of GDP 
Ghana GHA 2009 26.96 
Ghana GHA 2010 34.58 
Ghana GHA 2011 31.43 
Ghana GHA 2012 35.58 
Ghana GHA 2013 43.22 
Ghana GHA 2014 51.16 
Ghana GHA 2015 54.83 
Ghana GHA 2016 57.12 
Ghana GHA 2017 57.27 
Ghana GHA 2018 59.56 
Ivory Coast CIV 2009 64.24 
Ivory Coast CIV 2010 63.05 
Ivory Coast CIV 2011 69.15 
Ivory Coast CIV 2012 45.04 
Ivory Coast CIV 2013 43.36 
Ivory Coast CIV 2014 44.79 
Ivory Coast CIV 2015 47.27 
Ivory Coast CIV 2016 48.39 
Ivory Coast CIV 2017 49.84 
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Mauritania MRT 2009 62.38 
Mauritania MRT 2010 57.03 
Mauritania MRT 2011 50.85 
Mauritania MRT 2012 50.57 
Mauritania MRT 2013 51.26 
Mauritania MRT 2014 59.48 
Mauritania MRT 2015 75.18 
Mauritania MRT 2016 77.42 
Mauritania MRT 2017 75.89 
Nigeria NGA 2009 15.1 
Nigeria NGA 2010 9.4 
Nigeria NGA 2011 10.2 
Nigeria NGA 2012 22.43 
Nigeria NGA 2013 12.65 
Nigeria NGA 2014 12.65 
Nigeria NGA 2015 13.02 
Nigeria NGA 2016 16.27 
Nigeria NGA 2017 18.2 
Nigeria NGA 2018 19.09 
Senegal SEN 2009 26.85 
Senegal SEN 2010 28.31 
Senegal SEN 2011 32.72 
Senegal SEN 2012 34.17 
Senegal SEN 2013 36.77 
Senegal SEN 2014 42.37 
Senegal SEN 2015 44.51 
Senegal SEN 2016 47.53 
Senegal SEN 2017 61.23 








Gov. External Debt 
as %  of GNI 
Ghana  2009 25.51 
Ivory Coast 2009 63.82 
Mauritania 2009 84.59 
Nigeria  2009 5.75 
Senegal  2009 23.14 
Ghana  2010 26.42 
Ivory Coast 2010 48.82 
Mauritania 2010 83.31 
Nigeria  2010 4.5 
Senegal  2010 24.34 
Ghana  2011 27.15 
Ivory Coast 2011 52.44 
Mauritania 2011 74.69 
Nigeria  2011 4.56 
Senegal  2011 24.58 
Ghana  2012 30.11 
Ivory Coast 2012 36.81 
Mauritania 2012 84.87 
Nigeria  2012 4.15 
Senegal  2012 27.9 
Ghana  2013 26.01 
Ivory Coast 2013 33.01 
Mauritania 2013 83.03 
Nigeria  2013 4.32 
Senegal  2013 28.01 
Ghana  2014 34.4 
Ivory Coast 2014 28.5 
Mauritania 2014 88.49 
Nigeria  2014 4.6 
Senegal  2014 29.04 
Ghana  2015 41.43 
Ivory Coast 2015 35.44 
Mauritania 2015 107.33 
Nigeria  2015 6.08 
Senegal  2015 33.98 
Ghana  2016 39.22 
Ivory Coast 2016 32.53 
Mauritania 2016 110.16 
Nigeria  2016 7.89 
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Senegal  2016 36.1 
Ghana  2017 38.92 
Ivory Coast 2017 36.81 
Mauritania 2017 106.88 
Nigeria  2017 11.11 
Senegal  2017 43.41 
Ghana  2018 36.28 
Ivory Coast 2018 37.92 
Mauritania 2018 97.84 
Nigeria  2018 12.42 
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